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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
Justice Breyer, in an address to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, noted the per-
vasive use of expert witnesses in modern litigation: "My 
own Court's docket is illustrative, for scientific issues perme-
ate the law. Criminal courts consider the scientific validity 
of, say, DNA sampling, ... voice prints, or expert predictions 
of defendants' 'future dangerousness' which can lead courts 
or juries to authorize or withhold the death penalty." As the 
Justice's remarks suggest, the U.S. Supreme Court is play-
ing a prominent role in shaping the law governing the intro-
duction of scientific testimony. 
This article discusses this development, especially in 
light of the Court's latest decision, Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), and its impact on crimi-
nal trials under Ohio Evidence Rule 702. Even before 
Kumho Tire, many coL•rts began a reevaluation of a number 
of types of scientific evidence, such as hair comparisons, 
firearms identification, questioned document examinations, 
and polygraph results. In addition, a number of courts have 
confronted the admissibility of evidence based on social sci-
ence research- e.g., repressed memories and false con-
fessions. 
THE DAUBERTSTANDARD 
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), adopted a 
reliability test for determining the admissibility of scientific 
evidence and overruled the traditional general acceptance 
standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye standard had been the majority 
rule in both federal and state courts until Daubert. See 
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: 
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1197 (1980). 
The Supreme Court's decision rested on an interpretation 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the principal provision 
governing the admissibility of expert testimony. The rule 
provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
The Daubert Court wrote: "[l]n order to qualify as 'scientific 
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by 
the scientific method. Proposed testimC?nY must be support-
ed by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on 
what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's 
testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a 
standard of evidentiary reliability." ld. at 590. 
Reliability Factors 
In describing the trial judge's screening or "gatekeeping 
function," the Daubert Court identified a number of factors. 
First, in evaluating reliability, a judge should determine 
whether the scientific theory or technique can be and has 
been tested. Citing scientific authorities, the Court recog-
nized that a hallmark of science is empirical testing. 
Second, whether a theory or technique has been subjected 
to peer review and publication is "a relevant, though not dis-
positive, consideration in assessing ... scientific validity." ld. 
at 594. The peer review and publication process increases 
the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be detected. 
Third, a technique's "known or potential rate of error" is a 
pertinent factor. Fourth, the "existence and maintenance of 
standards controlling the technique's operation" are other 
indicia of trustworthiness. Finally, "general acceptance" re-
mains an important consideration. Although the Court re-
jected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admis-
sibility, it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability 
of scientific evidence-at least, circumstantially. These enu-
merated factors, however, are neither dispositive nor ex-
haustive. The Daubert Court cautioned: "Many factors will 
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a de-
finitive checklist or test." I d. at 593. Indeed, the Court em-
phasized that the standard is "a flexible one." ld. at 594. 
In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted that several au-
thorities had proposed additional factors for assessing relia-
bility. ld. at 595 n.12. The Court cited Judge Weinstein and 
Professor Berger's treatise; those authors listed the follow-
ing factors: (1) the technique's gerieral acceptance in the 
field, (2) the expert's qualifications and stature, (3) the use 
to which the new technique has been applied, (4) the poten-
tial rate of error, (5) the existence of specialized literature, 
(6) the novelty of the new invention, and (7) the extent to 
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which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of 
the expert. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence 702[03], at 702-41 to -42 (1988). Finally, the 
Court cited Justice Mark McCormick's article, which had 
specified eleven factors. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: 
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 
879, 911-12. (1982)(including the presence of safeguards in 
the characteristics of the technique, analogy to other scien-
tific techniques whose results are admissible, the nature 
and breadth of the inference adduced, the clarity and sim-
plicity with which the technique can be described and its re-
sults explained, the extent to which the basic data are verifi-
able by the court and the jury, and the availability of other 
experts to test and evaluate the technique). In sum, the 
Court made it clear that the Daubert factors were never in-
tended as an exhaustive, mechanical "checklist"-even with 
respect to "scientific" evidence. 
OHIO RULE 702 
The Ohio Supreme Court anticipated the U.S. Supreme 
Court's decision in Daubert by a decade. The Court had 
cited the Frye general acceptance test in several pre-Rules 
cases. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 
N.E.2d 137 (1981); Trebotich v. Broglio, 33 Ohio St.2d 57, 
59-60, 294 N .E.2d 669 (1 973); State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d 
81, 85, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969). However, in State v. 
Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983)(voice-
prints), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the Frye test, hold-
ing that the admissibility of novel scientific evidence should 
be governed by Rule 702 and Rule 403. According to the 
Court, "the Rules of Evidence establish adequate precondi-
tions for admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to 
the discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case by case 
basis, to decide whether the questioned testimony is rele-
vant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue." In State v. Pierce, 64 
Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d107 (1992), the Court affirmed 
its prior position rejecting the Frye test, while upholding the 
admissibility of DNA evidence. 
In 1994, Rule 702 was amended. Rule 702(C)(1) offers 
alternative ways to establish the validity of a scientific theo-
ry; the theory may either be "objectively verifiable" or "widely 
accepted." The "objectively verifiable" language codifies the 
approach adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Williams 
and Pierce, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's approach 
in Daubert. The phrase "widely accepted" was taken from 
an executive order issued by President Bush. Civil Justice 
Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,778,56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 
(1991 ). Under this order, a theory is considered "widely ac-
cepted" if it is accepted by at least a substantial minority of 
experts in the relevant field. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has since cited Daubert on 
several occasions. In Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 77 
Ohio St.3d 116, 124, 671 N.E.2d 252 (1996) (effects of acne 
drug, Accutane), the Court rejected a party's contention that 
Daubert "requires a finding that appellant did not create a 
jury question because the opinions elicited during testimony 
of appellant's experts were not scientifically valid. Our re-
view of the record of this case in its entirety convinces us 
that appellant's experts' opinions were sufficiently grounded 
in credible reasoning and scientific methodology to validly 
support appellant's theory of recovery." 
In Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St. 3d 607, 613, 687 
N.E.2d 735 (1 998), the Supreme Court noted that neither 
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general acceptance nor peer review are "prerequisites to 
admissibility under Daubert." The Court stated: 
[A] trial court's role in determining whether an expert's 
testimony is admissible under Evid.R. 702(C) focuses on 
whether the opinion is based upon scientifically valid 
principles, not whether the expert's conclusions are cor-
rect or whether the testimony satisfies the proponent's 
burden of proof at trial. ... 
Furthermore, the reliability requirement of Daubert 
should not be used to exclude all evidence of question-
able reliability, nor should a court exclude such evidence 
simply because the evidence is confusing. . . . Instead, 
there must be something that makes the scientific tech-
nique particularly overwhelming to laypersons for the 
court to exclude such evidence. . . . Thus, the "ultimate 
touchstone is helpfulness to the trier of fact, and with re-
gard to reliability, helpfulness turns on whether the ex-
pert's 'technique or principle [is] sufficiently reliable so 
that it will aid the jury in reaching accurate results."' ld. at 
613-14 (citations omitted). 
The Court commented again on this issue in State v. 
Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (1 998). 
In Miller, the court designated the following four fac-
tors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of scien-
tific evidence: (1) whether the theory or technique has 
been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer 
review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of 
error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained gen-
eral acceptance. 
These factors were adopted from Daubert . ... 
Both the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and 
this court in Miller were careful to emphasize that none of 
these factors is a determinative prerequisite to admissi-
bility. 
Relevant evidence based on valid principles will 
satisfy the threshold reliability standard for the admission 
of expert testimony. The credibility to be afforded these 
principles and the expert's conclusions remain a matter 
for the trier of fact. The reliability requirement in Evid.R. 
702 is a threshold determination that should focus on a 
particular type of scientific evidence, not the truth or falsi-
ty of an alleged scientific fact or truth. 
In State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St.3d 260, 261, 690 N.E.2d 
881 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the require-
ments of Rule 702(C)(1 ), (2), and (3) do not apply when ex-
pert testimony "did not involve scientific or technical testing 
or procedures." 
NON-SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY 
In interpreting Rule 702, the Court in Daubert dealt only 
with "scientific" knowledge. The plaintiffs had expressly 
proffered their epidemiological testimony as scientific evi-
dence. Rule 702, however, also refers in the alternative to 
''technical" and "specialized" knowledge. That alternate 
phrasing raised two issues: (1) whether Dauberfs reliability 
requirement extends to these other types of expert testimo-
ny, and (2) if so, whether the factors set forth in Daubert for 
assessing reliability apply in this context. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), answered both ques-
tions in the affirmative. Kumho Tire involved a civil case-a 
tire blow-out accident, in which the Court upheld the trial 
court's decision to exclude engineering testimony concern-
ing the cause of the blowout. However, the decision applies 
to criminal cases as well. 
Prior to Kumho Tire, most courts had held that some type 
of reliability standard applied to "technical" evidence, but 
they often differed on how reliability should be determined. 
Kumho Tire resolved this split of authority, at least in federal 
practice. The Supreme Court announced: "[A] trial court 
may consider one or more of the specific factors that 
Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that 
testimony's reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, 
the test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Dauberfs list of specific 
factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all ex-
perts or in every case." 119 S.Ct. at 1171. The Court 
added: 
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for 
all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in 
Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases cat-
egorized by category or expert or by kind of evidence .... 
Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear 
that its list of factors was meant to be helpful, not defini-
tive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply 
even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific 
testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in a 
particular case, for example, that a claim made by a sci-
entific witness has never been the subject of peer review, 
for the particular application at issue may never previous-
ly have interested any scientist. Nor, on the other hand, 
does the presence of Dauberfs general acceptance fac-
tor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where 
the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do 
theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted 
principles of astrology or necromancy. ld. at 1175. 
Procedural Issues 
The Supreme Court also addressed related procedural 
issues. The Court had previously ruled that a trial court's 
decision concerning the Daubert reliability requirement was 
subject to appellate review only for an abuse of discretion. 
See General-Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 
(1 997). In Kumho Tire, the Court ruled that appellate courts 
must accord trial judges discretion in other respects. There 
are two aspects to this ruling. First, substantively, ''whether 
Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable mea-
sures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the 
law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine." ld. at 
1176. Second, the judge enjoys discretion concerning the 
procedural aspects of this inquiry. The trial court is not re-
quired to hold a "Daubert hearing" every time expert testi-
mony is challenged. See Berger, Procedural Paradigms for 
Applying the DaubertTest, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1345 (1994). 
Proposed Federal Rule 
A proposed 1998 amendment to Rule 702 adds the fol-
lowing clause: "provided that (1) the testimony is sufficiently 
based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the wit-
ness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case." 181 F.R.D. 144 (1999). The advisory 
committee note states that the "amendment does not distin-
guish between scientific and other forms of expert testimo-
ny. The trial court's gatekeeping function applies to testimo-
ny by any expert." ld. at 149. This proposal with a few mod-
ifications, and an advisory committee note redrafted in light 
of Kumho Tire, was submitted to the Supreme Court by the 
Judicial Conference. If the Court accepts the proposal, it 
will become effective on December 1, 2000 - unless 
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Congress intervenes. 
HAIR COMPARISONS 
I) significant post-Dauber! attack on a well-accepted 
technique was launched in Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. 
Supp. 1529, 1552 (E. D. Okl. 1995), a federal habeas cor-
pus case. In this case an expert testified that hair samples 
were "microscopically consistent." However, the "expert did 
not explain which of the 'approximately' 25 characteristics 
were consistent, any standards for determining whether the 
samples were consistent, how many persons could be ex-
pected to share this same combination of characteristics, or 
how he arrived at his conclusions." ld. at 1554. Moreover, 
the district court professed that it had "been unsuccessful in 
its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair compar-
ison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert." 
I d. at 1558. The court observed: "Although the hair expert 
may have followed procedures acc;epted in the community 
of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in this 
case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable." ld. at 
1558. Finally, the prosecutor exacerbated the problem by 
stating in closing argument, "[T]here's a match." ld. at 1557. 
Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writing 
that the "hair evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent's 
apartment." ld. The district court decision was subsequently 
reversed on other grounds. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 
1508, 1523 (1Oth Cir. 1997) (due process, not Daubert, 
standard applies in habeas proceedings). Significantly, 
however, the defendant was later exonerated by exculpato-
ry DNA evidence. 
Williamson is not an isolated case, as demonstrated by a 
1996 Department of Justice report discussing the exonera-
tion of 28 convicts through the use of DNA technology-
some of whom had been sentenced to death. Connors et 
al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case 
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence 
After Trial 58 (1996). In several of these prosecutions, hair 
analysis was used to obtain the conviction. In one case, the 
expert testified that the crime scene hair sample "was un-
likely to match anyone" other than the defendant, Edward 
Honaker. DNA proved otherwise. See generally 2 Giannelli 
& lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 24-2 (3d ed. 1999) 
(hair analysis). 
FIREARMS IDENTIFICATIONS 
Another traditional technique now coming under fire is 
firearms identification ("ballistics"). Such evidence has been 
accepted as a matter of course by courts since the 1930s. 
However, in People v. Hawkins, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636 (Cal. 
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1685 (1 996), the defendant 
attacked the scientific basis of firearms identification evi-
dence. The prosecution experts "conceded that ballistics 
identification is not an exact science. Rather, ballistics ex-
perts develop proficiency by microscopically observing a 
large number of bullets known to have been fired from the 
same gun, and from different guns, so that they acquire 
knowledge of when the similarities of the bullets' striations 
are sufficient to establish that the bullets were discharged 
from the same firearm." ld. at 650. 
In rebuttal in Hawkins, the defense introduced two arti-
cles by Alfred Biasotti that call tor the reform of firearms 
identifications by developing a statistical data base. One 
expert "conceded that ballistics identification was to some 
extent more of a skill than a science, an intuition informed 
by extensive experience." ld. Although the Hawkins court 
upheld admissibility under Frye, this marks one of the first 
attacks on firearms identification evidence in half a century, 
and the opinion was rendered before Kumho was handed 
down. Kumho will likely encourage the defense to contiAue 
to the attack on firearms identification testimony. See gener-
ally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence ch. 14 
(3d ed. 1999)(firearms & toolmarks). 
BITEMARK COMPARISONS 
Until recently, expert testimony concerning bitemark com-
parisons had been routinely admitted into evidence, even to 
the extent of enjoying judicial notice. Nevertheless, a recent 
case questioned the judicial acceptance of such testimony. 
In Howard v. State, 697 So. 2d 415 (Miss. 1997), Dr. 
Michael West purportedly made a "positive match" between 
a bitemark on the victim and the defendant's teeth. "Dr. 
West testified that the science of dentistry recognized that 
teeth are unique, and that bite marks can 'be identified back 
to the perpetrator or biter.' Dr. West also stated that bite-
mark evidence is similar to fingerprint identification." ld. at 
428. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, apparently 
unimpressed. The court noted: 
While few courts have refused to allow some form of 
bite-mark comparison evidence, numerous scholarly au-
thorities have criticized the reliability of this method of 
identifying a suspect . .. . There is little consensus in the 
scientific community on the number of points which must 
match before any positive identification can be an-
nounced. . . . Suffice it to say that testimony concerning 
bite marks in soft, living flesh has not been scientifically 
accredited at this time. ld. at 429. 
See generally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence ch.13 (3d ed. 1999). 
HANDWRITING COMPARISONS 
The challenge to handwriting comparison testimony is 
perhaps the most prominent example of Daubert's influence 
in criminal cases. This challenge can be traced to a semi-
nal 1989 article written by Professors Risinger, Denbeaux 
and Saks, and entitled, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy 
for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting · 
Identification "Expertise," 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 (1989). 
The article directly attacked the conventional wisdom, pre-
senting a devastating critique of handwriting analysis and 
arguing that the reliability of such comparisons lacks valida-
tion: "Our literature search for empirical evaluation.of hand-
writing identification turned up one primitive and flawed va-
lidity study from nearly 50 years ago, one 1973 paper that 
raises the issue of consistency among examiners but that 
presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal in-
formation not qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and 
a summary of one study in a 1978 government report. 
Beyond this, nothing." ld. at 738 (citations omitted). Not 
only was validation lacking; worse still, there were indica-
tions of a troubling error rate in handwriting analysis. 
According to the authors, a review of five handwriting com-
parison proficiency tests showed that at best "[d]ocument 
examiners were correct 57% of the time and incorrect 43% 
of the time." ld. at 748. 
This article had little impact until Daubert was decided. 
However, in 1995 a federal district court concluded that "the 
testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that 
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a 
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certification program, professional journals and other trap-
pings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'sci-
entific ... knowledge."' United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court further stated 
that "while scientific principles may relate to aspects of 
handwriting analysis, they have little or nothing to do with 
the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic Document 
Examiners] .... [T]his attenuated relationship does not trans-
form the FDE into a scientist." ld. at 1 041. Nevertheless, 
the court did not exclude handwriting comparison testimony. 
Instead, the court pointed out that Rule 702 also permits ex-
pert testimony based on "technical" or "other specialized 
knowledge." In the court's view, while Daubert did not apply 
to nonscientific experts falling within these categories, Rule 
702's requirement that expert testimony assist the trier of 
fact mandated its own reliability analysis. 
The court proceeded to find the testimony sufficiently reli-
able as technical evidence but placed conditions on its ad-
missibility. Because FOE's use terms such as "laboratory" 
and refer to authorities with titles containing the words "sci-
ence" or "scientific," there is a risk that jurors may bestow 
upon FOE's the aura of the infallibility of science. 
Consequently, these terms should not be used in the testi-
mony, and the jury ought to receive a cautionary instruction 
that the testimony is based on experience, not science. 
Moreover, use of a nine-level scale of probability to express 
an opinion regarding genuineness appeared, in the court's 
view, to be misleadingly precise. "Such [overly fine] distinc-
tions are certainly improper in forensic document examina-
tion, where it is conceded that conclusions are drawn, in 
large part, on subjective criteria." I d. at 1048. Starzecpyzel 
sent shockwaves through the FDE field. 
The issue surfaced again in the Oklahoma bombing 
case. In United States v. McVeigh, 11 BNA Criminal 
Practice Manual88 (No. 5, Feb. 26, 1997), Judge Matsch 
expressed serious reservations about questioned document 
examination testimony: "I don't think there is any such sci-
entific knowledge. And that's why I don't think that ... these 
people can express such opinions." Rudolf & Widenhouse, 
Daubert Redux: Oklahoma City Bomb Case, 21 Champion 
24, 25-26 (May 1997). The judge added: 
There are no agreed standards for the terminology. 
There is no confidence level that's been agreed upon .... 
We do not have any body of scientific knowledge of 
which I am aware that says that there are such identify-
ing characteristics every time a person puts pencil or pen 
to paper that you can say that's who it is .... And they do 
it by experience. There is no academy of training for 
these people. They just say, I've done enough of that 
that now, I'm a self-declared expert at it. 
See also United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 168 (3d 
Cir. 1997)(dissent)("Handwriting analysis is at best an inex-
act science, and at worst mere speculation itself .... As 
such, I do not believe that wholly ambiguous testimony from 
a handwriting 'expert' ... can satisfy the government's bur-
den of proof."). 
This litigation has had the salutary effect of encouraging 
new research in this area, principally by Professor Moshe 
Kam of Drexel University. To date, Kam has published 
three studies on questioned documents. This research will 
become ammunition in the battle under Kumho. See Kam et 
al., Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in 
Writer Identification, 39 J. Forensic Sci. 5, 6 (1994 )("In our 
tests, the professional document examiners performed sig-
nificantly better than members of the control group .... "); 
Kam et al., Writer Identification by Professional Document 
Examiners, 42 J. Forensic Sci. 778 (1997)( "The results of 
our test lay to rest the debate over whether or not profes-
sional document examiners possess writer-identification 
skills absent in the general population. They do."); Kam et 
al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of 
Nonprofessionals in Document-Examination Proficiency 
Tests, 43 J. Forensic Sci. 1000 (1998). 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the admissibility issue in 
United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906,911 (11th Cir. 1999), 
which was decided after KumhO had been handed down. 
The court found that the prosecution expert was qualified 
and that his testimony assisted the trier of fact. The court 
concluded "that the ability of the jury to perform the same vi-
sual comparisons as the expert 'cuis against the danger of 
undue prejudice from the mystique attached to "experts."' .... 
[The expert] specifically identified points of comparison that 
he recognized between the writing of the extortion note and 
the handwriting examples that Paul provided. The jury was 
free to conduct its own comparison and reach its own con-
clusion regarding the author of the extortion note." 
Moreover, the expert "acknowledged on cross-examination 
that no licensing board existed for questioned documents 
examiners, and the profession is not subject to standards 
that quantify or measure the work of individual examiners. 
Given [the expert's] admissions, the jury would not have 
been confused whether handwriting analysis is scientific or 
is unassailable." 
Paul is in accord with the Sixth Circuit's earlier decision in 
United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160 (6th Cir. 1997), 
in which that court wrote: "[The defendant] is, therefore, 
asking us to do what no other court that we have found has 
done-hold that expert handwriting analysis is inadmissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence." ld. at 1159. The 
Jones court upheld the admissibility of the evidence. Of 
particular interest is the stress Jones placed on the qualifi-
cations issue, specifying in great detail the expert's back-
ground. The court concluded: "To put it bluntly, the federal 
government pays him to analyze documents, the precise 
task he was called upon to do in the district court." ld. at 
1160. 
In Paul the Eleventh Circuit also ruled that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in barring Professor 
Denbeaux, one of the authors of the Pennsylvania Law 
Review article, as a defense witness. In the court's view, 
"[h]is skill, experience, training and education as a lawyer 
did not make him any more qualified to testify as an expert 
on handwriting analysis than a lay person who read the 
same articles." In contrast, the Third Circuit reached the op-
posite conclusion in United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 
844, 846 (3d Cir. 1995)(finding that the trial judge "erred as 
a matter of law in denying the defense the opportunity to 
criticize the standards employed in that field of expertise." 
Denbeaux would have testified that "handwriting analysis is 
not a valid field of scientific expertise because it lacks stan-
dards to guide experts in weighing the match or non-match 
of particular handwriting characteristics."). 
In another post-Kumho case, United States v. Hines, 55 
F.Supp.2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999), the court asserted that 
Kumho"plainly invit[es] a reexamination even of 'generally 
accepted' venerable, technical fields." As a result, expert 
testimony concerning the general similarities and differ-
ences between a defendant's handwriting exemplar and a 
stick up note was admissible but not the specific conclusion 
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that the defendant was the author, because such an opinion 
lacked empirical validation. 
Just as an article prompted the cases, in turn the cases 
spawned several articles. Risinger and Saks released a 
second article in 1996: Science and Nonscience in the 
Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 
82 Iowa L. Rev. 21 (1996). Professor Andre Moenssens 
published a rebuttal article: Handwriting Identification 
Evidence In the Post-Daubert World: Identifying the 
Genuine Article and the Genuine Legal Issue: Broader 
Standards Needed for "Scientific Knowledge," 66 U.M.K.C. 
L. Rev. 251 (1997). Not surprisingly, Risinger, Denbeaux, 
and Saks were not in full agreement with Moenssens's 
analysis. Indeed, they promptly rejoined with a 1998 article, 
disagreeing with his "bottom line" and critiquing his analysis. 
Brave New "Post-Daubert World"-A Reply to Professor 
Moenssens, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 405 (1998). This battle is 
ongoing. See generally 2 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence ch. 21 (3d ed. 1999). 
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE 
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Posada, 57 F.3d 428 
(5th Cir. 1995), stated that "the rationale underlying this cir-
cuit's per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence did 
not survive Daubert." ld. at 429. The court went on to com-
ment that "[t]here can be no doubt that tremendous ad-
vances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and 
technique in the years since Frye [1923] .... Current re-
search indicates that, when given under controlled condi-
tions, the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or 
deception between seventy and ninety percent of the time." 
ld. at 434. The court, however, limited its ruling, comment-
ing that "we do not now hold that polygraph examinations 
are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier 
of fact . . . . We merely remove the obstacle of the per se 
· rule against admissibility, which was based on antiquated 
concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph and 
legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the 
Supreme Court." ld. See also United States v. Pettigrew, 77 
F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996) (trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding polygraph evidence). 
The Ninth Circuit adopted the same position. See United 
States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that its former per se rule of exclusion is inconsistent 
with Daubert). Two other circuits had embraced this posi-
tion prior to Daubert, the Seventh Circuit had long aban-
doned the per se rule. See United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 
192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Our decisions acknowledge the 
considerable scientific and legal debate over polygraph test-
ing and recognize that a trial court deciding whether to 
admit polygraph evidence 'must engage in a delicate bal-
ancing of many factors including probative value, prejudicial 
effect, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and 
undue delay.") (quoting United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 
1472, 1480 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 
(1993)). In 1989 the Eleventh Circuit followed suit. United 
States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989). 
Admissibility Decisions 
These decisions lead some commentators to believe that 
Daubert had changed the legal landscape. The "trend ap-
pears to be moving toward admissibility." Zehnle, Polygraph 
Admissibility in the Post-Daubert Era, ABA Criminal Justice 
11, 13 (Summer 1997). In this altered climate, some district 
courts admitted polygraph evidence. See United States v. 
Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (admitting poly-
graph evidence offered by the defense); State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299 (W.O. La. 1995) (admitting poly-
graph evidence in a civil case). 
Two cases are of particular note. In United States v. 
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. Ariz. 1995), the court 
ruled the evidence admissible: 
A polygrapher is an expert in determining credibility. 
If a party can lay the proper foundation to qualify such a 
witness, then the requirements of Rule 608(a) will be 
met. The polygrapher will not testify that he knows of the 
subject's reputation for honesty, but that as an expert in 
determining credibility, with respect to this case, the sub-
ject has demonstrated a character for truthfulness .... 
[Although] the polygraph evidence's primary purpose is 
to show credibility, ... it also is evidence that shows 
Defendant was willing to take a polygraph and, in fact, 
passed the examination. ld. at 1363. 
United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 
1995), is another illustration. The court noted: "It is not en-
tirely clear whether Daubert requires as a prerequisite to ad-
missibility that the proponent establish the validity of the 
specific application of a scientific technique." ld. at 880-81. 
"[A]fter reviewing the case law addressing this issue in the 
context of other forensic laboratory techniques and after 
careful consideration of the testimony presented at the 
hearing regarding the polygraph technique, the Court holds 
that in the context of polygraph evidence, such scrutiny is 
imperative to a faithful application of Daubert." The court 
went on to rule "that in addition to establishing the scientific 
validity of the polygraph technique in the abstract, the pro-
ponent of the proposed testimony must also prove that the 
specific examination was conducted properly by a compe-
tent examiner." ld. at 895. "In conclusion, having deter-
mined that Dr. Raskin's testimony is based on 'scientific 
knowledge' that 'will assist the trier of fact' the Court finds 
that such testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be 
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702." 
Opposing Views 
Other federal circuit courts took a more cautious ap-
proach. See Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that "unilaterally obtained polygraph evi-
dence is almost never admissible under Evidence Rule 
403"), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); United States v. 
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A privately 
commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the 
government until after its completion, is of extremely dubi-
ous probative value."); United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 
723, 729 (8th Cir. 1996) (defendant failed to lay a founda-
tion for polygraph admissibility). 
Indeed, the Second Circuit wrote that "the 'legal 
Pandora's box' which the Fifth Circuit opened in United 
States v. Posado ... is not yet agape in this Circuit." United 
States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1995) ('The 
record before us simply does not provide the proper oppor-
tunity to explore the validity of polygraph evidence under 
Rule 702."). See also United States v. Pitner, 969 F. Supp. 
1246 (W.O. Wash. 1997); United States v. Castillo, 1997 WL 
83746 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (polygraph evidence not admissible 
under Evid. R. 608); Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581, 
587 (D. Conn. 1996) ("[W]hile the accuracy of the COT poly-
graph exam has been tested, there are serious flaws which 
may underestimate the error rates .... "); Miller v. Heaven, 
922 F. Supp. 495, 503 (D. Kan. 1996) (insufficient showing 
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under Daubert and excludable under Rule 403); United 
States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 757, 740 (E.D. Mich. 
1995) (excluding evidence); United States v. Lech, 895 F. 
Supp. 582,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he polygraph results 
here are properly excluded under Rule 403."); United States 
v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("After eval-
uating the standard set forth in the Daubert case, premised 
on Rule 702 ... , the Court believes that nothing in Daubert 
would disturb the settled precedent that polygraph evidence 
is neither reliable nor admissible."). 
Recently, in United States v. Cordoba, 194 F. 3d 1 053 
(9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit considered Cordoba's ap-
peal from the district court's decision after remand. See 
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 
1997). Instead of excluding polygraph evidence based on 
the per se rule of exclusion, the district court (after a two-
day hearing) excluded the evidence under the Daubert 
analysis. The appellate court upheld this decision. 
State Cases 
In addition, the state cases have not been influenced by 
this development; several have reaffirmed the rule of cate-
gorical inadmissibility. E.g., People v. Gard, 632 N.E.2d 
1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994) ("[T]he use of polygraph evidence ... 
is no less repugnant to and no Jess an affront to the integrity 
of the judicial process when the examination has been 
given to a witness ... than it is when the examination has 
been given to the defendant himself."). 
Even while citing Daubert, courts have rejected poly-
graph evidence. E.g., State v. Porter, 694 A.2d 1262 (Conn. 
1997) (adopting Daubert and excluding polygraph results 
under Rule 403); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486, 493 (W. 
Va. 1995) ("[W]e remain convinced that the reliability of 
such examinations is still suspect and not generally accept-
ed within the relevant scientific community. Therefore, any 
speculation that our position in Frazier regarding polygraph 
· admissibility is in question due to the Daubert/Wilt rulings is 
put to rest today."). Other courts have continued to require 
stipulations. E.g., State v. Webber, 918 P.2d 609, 619-20 
(Kan. 1996) (citing "the ironclad rule that the results of such 
examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation between 
the parties"); State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996) 
(reaffirming the need for a stipulation). 
Constitutional Issues 
In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.303, 118 S.Ct. 1261 
(1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the per se rule of 
exclusion was not unconstitutional. The Court acknowl-
edged once more the right to present a defense, albeit a 
qualified right. "A defendant's right to present relevant evi-
dence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable 
restrictions." 118 S.Ct. at 1264. In the Court's view, evi-
dence "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a 
defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or disproportion-
ate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Moreover, 
we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has in-
fringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." ld. 
Justice Thomas's majority opinion identified three interests 
that support the per se rule of exclusion: (1) ensuring that 
only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, (2) preserving 
the jury's role in determining credibility, and (3) avoiding liti-
gation of collateral issues. As to reliability, the opinion noted 
that "the scientific community remains extremely polarized 
about the reliability of polygraph techniques." ld. at 1265. 
The opinion also observed that "[n]othing in Daubert fore-
closed, as a constitutional matter, per se exclusionary rules 
for certain types of expert or scientific evidence." ld. at 1266 
n. 7. Justice Thomas also cited the jury's role in determin-
ing credibility: "By its very nature, polygraph evidence may 
diminish the jury's role in making credibility determinations." 
ld. at 1267. A third reason, in Justice Thomas's view, is the 
avoidance of litigation on collateral issues, which "prolongs 
criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury from its cen-
tral function of determining guilt or innocence." .I d. 
Justice Kennedy along with three other Justices rejected 
the second and third interest. In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy pointed out that Federal Rule 704 abolish-
es the ultimate issue rule and thus the invading-the-
province-of-the-jury argument had been rejected under 
most modern evidence codes. Significantly, he also wrote: 
! doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, 
and some later case might present a more compelling 
case for introduction of the testimony than this one does. 
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial court 
in admitting and excluding scientific evidence is not a 
constitutional mandate, see Daubert ... there is some 
tension between that rule and our holding today. And, as 
Justice Stevens points out [in dissent], there is much in-
consistency between the Government's extensive use of 
polygraph to make vital security determinations and the 
argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of 
these tests. ld. at 1269. 
Indeed, the extensive use of the polygraph by the gov-
ernment is well documented. For example, in 1996, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) conducted 12,548 polygraph 
examinations. Sixty-three percent (7,945) involved the DoD 
Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The 
other categories include 21.5% criminal investigations 
(2,696), 4.6% exculpatory (579), and 10.6% miscellaneous 
(1 ,328). The latter includes security investigations, counter-
intelligence and intelligence operations, and assistance to 
non-DoD federal agencies. Department of Defense, 
Polygraph Program, Annual Report to Congress 1 (1996). 
Further, the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute 
(DoDPI) trains 1 00 federal examiners a year in a masters 
level program, as well as allocates funds for polygraph re-
search. The DoDPI trains all federal polygraph examiners. 
See also Ronald M. Furgerson, Perspectives on 
Polygraphs: A Guide to Survival, 21 Polygraph 164, 164 
(1992) (from 1977 to 1992, 115 FBI agents have attended 
the DoD Polygraph Institute (or its predecessor); they have 
conducted over 40,000 polygraph exams). 
Moreover, the polygraph is frequently used in criminal 
cases. For example, many jurisdictions admit polygraph ev-
idence upon stipulation, even though the stipulation does 
nothing to enhance the reliability of the evidence, which is 
the principal reason for exclusion. Similarly, courts have ad-
mitted polygraph evidence in suppression hearings, sen-
tencing hearings, motions for new trial proceedings, and 
prison disciplinary hearings. In addition, some courts have 
enforced plea bargains based on polygraph evidence. In 
some cases prosecutors have gone beyond stipulating to 
the admissibility of test results and have agreed to dismiss 
charges if the defendant passes a polygraph examination. 
See also United States v. Santiago-Gonzales, 66 F.3d 3, 6 
n. 1 (1st Cir. 1995) (polygraph used to measure defendant's 
requirement to be truthful under a plea agreement). See 
generally Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49 
Hastings L.J. 895 (1998). 
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SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE 
Another category of cases vulnerable to re-examination 
under Kumho concerns so-called "syndrome" evidence-
e.g., battered woman syndrome (BWS), rape traum_a syn-
drome (RTS), and child sexual abuse accommodation syn-
drome (CSAAS). 
Rape Trauma Syndrome 
The initial research on rape trauma syndrome was devel-
oped to aid rape victims: "[R]ape trauma syndrome ~as not 
devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular 
past event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense 
occurred-but rather was developed by professional rape 
counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and 
treat emotional problems experienced by the counselor's 
clients or patients." People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 
(Cal. 1984). In therapy, what the patient thinks happened is 
often more important than what actually happened. 
This research may still, however, be useful at trial for non-
substantive purposes. RTS evidence may be helpful on a 
credibility theory if the defendant suggests to the jury that 
the victim's conduct after the incident, such as a delay in re-
porting the assault, is inconsistent with the claim of rape. In 
this situation, "expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome 
may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of 
some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape vic-
tims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of ... popular 
myths." ld. at 298. Most courts accept this view, admitting 
expert testimony to account for a victim's (1) passive resis-
tance during a rape, (2) delay in reporting the crime, (3) fail-
ure to attempt to escape, and (4) calm demeanor after an 
attack. RTS evidence has also been introduced to explain 
that "in the context of a trust relationship, such as a doctor-
patient relationship, some victims may return to the trusted 
relationship for further contact with the perpetrator of the as-
sault." Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951 
(Mass. 1990). 
Repressed Memories 
Similarly, repressed memories and hypnotically en-
hanced testimony are subject to challenge. In Borawick v. 
Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 
1219 (1996), a civil case, the plaintiff had no memory of 
child abuse for 20 years. Then after hypno-therapy, she 
claimed to recall that her aunt and uncle had sexually 
abused her when she was age 4 and 7. The Second 
Circuit, in a case of first impression, ruled the repressed 
memory evidence inadmissible. The court conceded: "We 
do not believe that Daubert is directly applicable to the issue 
here since Daubert concerns the admissibility of data de-
rived from scientific techniques or expert opinions." ld. at 
610. Nevertheless, "[e]ven though Daubert does not pro-
vide direct guidance, our decision today is informed by the 
principles underlying the Supreme Court's holding." ld. 
False Confessions 
Re-evaluation under Kumho does not, however, neces-
sarily mean exclusion; social science research may offer 
valuable insights-if based on methodologically sound stud-
ies. Hence, in United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 
1996), the Seventh Circuit ruled that the trial court erred 
when it excluded expert testimony on false confessions: 
[The trial court] ruling overlooked the utility of valid social 
science. Even though the jury may have had beliefs 
about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs 
were correct. Properly conducted social science re-
search often shows that commonly held beliefs are in 
!3rror. Dr. Ofshe's testimony, assuming its scientific valid-
ity, would have let the jury know that a phenomenon 
known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it, 
and how to decide whether it fits the facts of the case 
being tried. ld. at 1345. 
Similarly, in United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 
1995), the First Circuit reversed the trial court's exclusion of 
psychiatric testimony that the defendant's inculpatory state-
ments were caused by pseudologia fantastica, a mental dis-
order rendering the person a pathological liar who makes 
false statements without regard to their consequences. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shuck, 953 
S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1997), reached a similar result. The 
Shuck court ruled admissible a neuropsychologist's testimo-
ny concerning a defendant's acute susceptibility to induce-
ment in support of an ertrapment defense. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Kumho Tire the Supreme Court once again affirmed its 
determination to improve the quality of expert testimony in 
federal trials: "The objective of [Oauberfs gatekeeping] re-
quirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert 
testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether bas-
ing testimony upon professional studies or personal experi-
ence, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectu-
al rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field." 119 S.Ct. at 1176. As forceful as these 
words are, the Court's actions may speak even louder: 
When the dust settled at the end of each case in its expert 
testimony trilogy-Daubert, Joinder, and Kumho, the Court 
had upheld the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony. 
It is true that in Daubert, the Court remanded. However, on 
remand, the court of appeals again excluded the evidence, 
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995). 
